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Attorneys as Arbitrators
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and A. C. Pritchard

ABSTRACT

We study the role of attorneys as arbitrators in securities arbitration. We find that arbitrators
who also represent brokerage firms or brokers in other arbitrations award significantly less
compensation to investor-claimants than do other arbitrators. We find no significant effect
for attorney-arbitrators who represent investors or both investors and brokerage firms. The
relation between representing brokerage firms and arbitration awards remains significant even
when we control for political outlook. Arbitrators who donate money to Democratic political
candidates award greater compensation than do arbitrators who donate to Republican candidates. We also study the dynamics of panel interaction. We find that the position of chair
is an important factor in assessing an arbitrator’s influence, although the financial relationships
of other arbitrators may also affect arbitration awards. Coalitions with the other arbitrators
are also important. If the chair and another panelist possess a common attribute, the effect
on the arbitration award increases.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon (482 U.S. 220 [1987]) that investor claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable. That decision was soon followed
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. (490 U.S.
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477 [1989]), in which the Court overruled Wilko v. Swan (346 U.S. 427
[1953]) and held that mandatory arbitration provisions in brokerage
customer agreements for claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are
also enforceable. Since those decisions, virtually all brokerage customer
agreements contain a clause requiring disputes between the customer
and the broker to be submitted to arbitration. The vast majority of these
arbitrations take place in a forum administered by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), formerly known as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). During the period studied here,
the NASD handled approximately 90 percent of customer claims against
brokers (the remaining 10 percent were handled by the New York Stock
Exchange [NYSE]). The number of claims filed per year fluctuates, averaging 5,000–6,000 cases and peaking at almost 9,000 in 2003.1 Since
1996, the NASD/FINRA has handled approximately 70,000 claims.
The fact that arbitration is now ubiquitous in the securities industry
makes it difficult to evaluate the results of FINRA arbitrations; there is
no alternative venue for dispute resolution with which to compare the
process (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2000, pp. 4–5).2 Despite the
absence of solid evidence on the process, arbitration has consistently
been criticized as favoring the securities industry over the interests of
investors (Morgenstern 2006). The inescapable fact is that the arbitration
process is run by the FINRA, so it is necessarily dominated by the association’s members. The NASD created the Arbitration Policy Task
Force in 1994 to evaluate and respond to a number of criticisms, including claims that the system was biased or industry dominated. Although the NASD’s task force found no evidence of bias, a number of
its recommendations were designed to improve the perceived and actual
fairness of the system, leading to rule changes in 2004 and 2007 and
increased updating and affirmation by arbitrators that their disclosure
is adequate.
The criticisms of FINRA’s process focus, in particular, on the use of
industry arbitrators—including, among others, those with present or
recent employment ties to securities brokerage firms. Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority arbitrations involving requested awards of
$50,000 or more are decided by panels of three arbitrators: one industry
1. This number includes disputes between firms in the securities industry and their
registered representatives.
2. The inability of customers to pursue litigation as an alternative precludes the type
of study that is common in analyzing labor arbitrations in which arbitration outcomes are
compared with the results of litigated cases, such as Clermont and Schwab (2004).
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arbitrator and two public arbitrators. Critics have challenged the definition of a public arbitrator as insufficiently restrictive. In some cases,
they have argued that the definition of a public arbitrator, which includes
individuals who have certain financial relationships to the brokerage
industry, is insufficiently stringent to preserve the neutrality of the public
arbitrators. Most notably, the financial thresholds do not exclude attorneys who commit only a small portion of their practice to representing
brokerage firms; such attorneys are classified as public. Moreover, some
commentators claim that the standards are inadequately enforced and
that arbitrators with significant conflicts or industry ties are able to serve
as public arbitrators despite the limitations of the rules.
Another criticism leveled at securities arbitration is that it allows
arbitrators excessive discretion. There are no real mechanisms for ensuring that arbitrators follow the law. This opens the door for arbitrators
to be swayed by their preferences in making arbitration awards. Lawyers,
by definition, are trained in the law, but that does not mean that they
will follow it if no one monitors their decisions.
This study attempts to shed some empirical light on the role that
attorneys (termed “attorney-arbitrators”) play as arbitrators in securities
arbitration. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority does not require that securities arbitrators be trained as lawyers. Nonetheless, attorneys dominate the arbitration process, and in our sample 82.2 percent
of public arbitrators were attorneys. Significantly, serving as a securities
arbitrator is not a full-time job; attorney-arbitrators continue to play
other roles, including serving as advocates for investors and brokerage
firms in securities arbitration. Do lawyers who serve in these roles differ
in their judgments from other securities arbitrators?
To explore the role of attorneys in securities arbitration, we analyze
a data set of 422 randomly selected arbitrators and their 6,724 securities
arbitration awards from 1992 to 2006. We find that attorney-arbitrators
who have represented brokerage firms in other securities arbitration
cases are significantly less generous with arbitration awards. The relation
appears to be primarily driven by the presence of an attorney who has
represented a brokerage firm by serving as the chair of an arbitration
panel. We find no significant relation between an attorney who has represented brokerage firms and award size when that attorney is not the
chair of the arbitration panel. Coalition effects, nonetheless, exist. Although not important alone, other panel arbitrators with similar views
reinforce the preferences of an arbitration chair. In contrast with our
results for attorney-arbitrators who represent brokerage firms, we report
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that attorneys who represent investors in arbitration proceedings are not
more generous when they serve as arbitrators, nor are arbitrators who
represent both investors and brokerage houses. Finally, we find evidence
that arbitrators who have made political contributions to Democratic
candidates are significantly more generous in their arbitration awards
than their counterparts who have made no political contributions or
who have contributed exclusively to Republican candidates.
We proceed as follows. We lay out the background on FINRA arbitration procedures and survey prior literature in Section 2. Section 3
sets forth our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our sample and variables
and reports the results of our empirical tests. Section 5 concludes.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Procedures

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rules establish two categories
of arbitrators—public and nonpublic (industry). Under the current procedures, claims for less than $25,000 are resolved through a simplified
procedure involving a single arbitrator who resolves the case without a
formal hearing. Claims for between $25,000 and $50,000 receive a hearing conducted by a single arbitrator, although any party has the right
to request a three-person panel. If the claim is heard by a single arbitrator,
FINRA rules require that the arbitrator be a public arbitrator unless the
parties agree otherwise. Claims for $50,000 or more are resolved by a
panel consisting of three arbitrators.3 If the case is heard by a threeperson panel, the rules provide that the panel will be composed of two
public arbitrators and one nonpublic (industry) arbitrator.
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rules specify a variety of
professional and personal characteristics that result in an arbitrator’s
being classified as industry rather than public. Under the rules now in
effect, current and former professionals in the securities industry and
other professionals with substantial industry ties may not be classified
as public arbitrators (FINRA Rule 10308[a][5]). Persons who work as
investment advisors or for an affiliate of a securities firm and persons
with a parent, child, or spouse in the securities industry do not qualify
as public arbitrators (see FINRA 2007). Public arbitrators are thus in3. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has now raised this limit to
$100,000 (FINRA Regulatory Notice 09–13 [2009]).
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tended to be industry outsiders or “neutrals.” Nonpublic arbitrators,
commonly known as industry arbitrators, include current and former
brokers, bankers, and other securities professionals. The category also
includes attorneys, accountants, and other professionals who have devoted 20 percent or more of their professional work to industry clients
(FINRA Rule 10308[a][4]). The rules have been amended several times,
most recently in 20044 and 2007,5 in an effort to eliminate potential
conflicts and biases from the category of public arbitrators.6 In 2008,
FINRA amended its rules to prohibit an attorney, accountant, or other
professional from being classified as a public arbitrator if the person’s
firm derived $50,000 or more in annual revenue in the past 2 years from
professional services to a broker, brokerage firm, or other industry client
relating to any customer disputes concerning an investment account or
transaction (Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, Exchange Act Release No. 54,792 [March
19, 2008]).
Since November 1998, arbitrators for FINRA arbitrations have been
chosen through a list selection system administered by the director of
dispute resolution, termed the Neutral List Selection System (or NLSS).7
4. The 2004 amendments (effective July 19, 2004) increased from 3 years to 5 years
the period for transitioning from a nonpublic to public arbitrator after leaving the securities
industry; clarified that the term “retired” from the industry includes anyone who spent a
substantial part of his or her career in the industry; prohibited anyone who has been
associated with the industry for at least 20 years from ever becoming a public arbitrator,
regardless of how long ago the association ended; excluded from the public arbitrator
roster attorneys, accountants, or other professionals whose firms derived 10 percent or
more of their annual revenue in the previous 2 years from clients involved in securitiesrelated activities; provided that investment advisors may not serve as public arbitrators;
and amended the definition of immediate family member to add parents, children, stepparents, stepchildren, and any member of the arbitrator’s household (thus excluding persons
with immediate family members employed in the securities industry).
5. In 2005, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) amended the definition of public arbitrator to exclude individuals who work for (or who have an immediate
family member who works for) an entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with a broker-dealer. The NASD also amended its rules so that individuals registered
through broker-dealers may not be public arbitrators, even if they are employed by a nonbroker-dealer (such as a bank). This amendment became effective on January 15, 2007.
6. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority recently introduced a pilot program
under which a limited number of cases are decided by panels consisting entirely of public
arbitrators (Hansard 2008). The program is an attempt to respond to criticisms that the
inclusion of an industry arbitrator results in awards that are biased against investors.
7. The NASD’s Neutral List Selection System (NLSS) went into effect on November
17, 1998. The NLSS was proposed by the NASD Arbitration Policy Task Force as part of
its 1996 Securities Arbitration Reform Report and modeled after the list selection system
used by the American Arbitration Association. The report recommended that panels for
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During most of the time period covered by our study, the NASD provided
the parties in each case with two separate lists, one consisting of public
arbitrators and the other consisting of nonpublic arbitrators, in a roughly
two-to-one ratio. At first the practice was to provide a list of eight public
arbitrators and four nonpublic arbitrators, but this was later increased
to 10 and five, respectively. The lists were generated by an NASD computer program using a rotational method, although the computer eliminated arbitrators with obvious conflicts of interest. Along with the lists,
the parties were also provided with background information on each
arbitrator, including a copy of that arbitrator’s Arbitrator Disclosure
Report. Parties were allowed to request additional information about
the arbitrators, and the NASD director was required to forward that
request to the arbitrators, although the arbitrators were not required to
respond.
Each party was allowed to strike an unlimited number of arbitrators
on the list for any reason. The parties each then ranked the remaining
arbitrators, ranking the public and nonpublic arbitrators separately. The
NASD director appointed a panel consisting of the two public arbitrators
and one nonpublic arbitrator who received the highest combined rankings from the parties. If, after the parties’ strikes were exercised, an
insufficient number of arbitrators remained on the lists to fill the panel,
the director completed the panel by appointing additional arbitrators
whose names were produced through computer selection.
The chair of the panel appears to exercise the greatest degree of
control over the arbitration proceedings and is typically responsible for
the overall administration of the proceeding, including the resolution of
discovery disputes, ruling on evidentiary issues, and so forth.8 During
the period of our study, the parties had the right, in the first instance,
to designate the chair of the panel by agreement, although, according
to FINRA, the parties agreed on the designation of the chair only 20
larger cases continue to be composed of one industry member and two public arbitrators. The report recommended improving the quality of arbitrators by increasing arbitrator
compensation, requiring better training, expanding the arbitrator pool, and requiring arbitrator evaluation of copanelists. The report also made some highly controversial recommendations concerning the availability of punitive damages in arbitration awards.
8. When it requested approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission to establish qualifications for panel chairs, FINRA stated that “chairpersons . . . play a vital
role in the administration of cases” (Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASD, Inc.; Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Thereto to Amend
NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 51,856 [June
15, 2005], 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,445 [June 23, 2005]).
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percent of the time (Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASD, Inc.; Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, and
4 Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,856 [June 15, 2005], 70 Fed. Reg. 36,445
[June 23, 2005]). If the parties were unable to agree, the chair was
appointed by the director and was to be the public arbitrator who received the highest combined ranking “as long as the person is not an
attorney, accountant, or other professional who has devoted 50 percent
or more of his or her professional or business activities, within the last
two years, to representing or advising public customers in matters relating to disputed securities or commodities transactions or similar matters” (NASD Code of Arbitration, Rule 10308[c][5][A]). If this was the
case, the director was to appoint the other public arbitrator as chair.
In no case was a nonpublic arbitrator to serve as chair unless the
parties consented. Moreover, even in cases in which the parties could
not agree on the chair designation, an arbitrator could not be appointed
as chair unless the parties had selected him or her to the panel. The
infrequency with which the parties agreed on the designation of the chair
suggests that they tend to have relatively less control over the chair
designation than the overall composition of the panel. The chair selection
process also limits a party’s ability to select for particular chair criteria—
such as industry expertise in a complicated case.9
Arbitrators are chosen from a pool of almost 7,000 available arbitrators, of which approximately 58 percent are public arbitrators and
42 percent are industry arbitrators. Arbitrators are paid $200 for each
hearing session, with the chair receiving an additional $75 a day. Arbitrator candidates are not required to possess any particular qualifications beyond at least 5 years of full-time, paid business or professional
experience and at least 2 years of college-level credits (FINRA 2009).10
Since 1993, however, FINRA has required new arbitrators to go through
9. In 2007, FINRA modified the list selection system in several ways. First, FINRA
moved to a system in which it maintains three separate rosters of arbitrators—public
arbitrators, nonpublic arbitrators, and chair-qualified arbitrators. Lists of eight potential
arbitrators are generated from each roster and sent to the parties. The parties are now
permitted only four strikes from each list rather than an unlimited number of strikes,
although additional arbitrators can be challenged for cause. The rationale for this change
was to reduce the frequency with which the generation of additional lists would be required.
In addition, FINRA shifted from a rotational system to random selection to generate the
lists.
10. The college credit requirement was added in 2003.
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its comprehensive basic arbitrator training program; since 1998, new
arbitrators have been required to pass an examination.11
In addition to the more formal arbitration procedure, FINRA offers
a nonbinding mediation program. During the period 2005–7, according
to FINRA’s statistics, approximately 70–80 percent of claims filed were
settled or resolved through means other than an arbitrator decision, 3–4
percent of cases were resolved by arbitrators on the basis of written
submissions, and 18–20 percent of cases were resolved after a formal
hearing.12 Because our study focuses on reported decisions—the only
cases for which information is publicly available—we necessarily face a
selection problem, which we discuss in greater detail below.
2.2. Prior Literature

Several commentators have attempted to evaluate the fairness of the
FINRA arbitration process. To date, these studies have been inconclusive.
First, in the absence of a basis for assessing the merits of the claims,
studies of win rates or award ratios suffer from the lack of a baseline
with which to compare them. Second, efforts to assess potential arbitrator bias empirically are hampered by the lack of background information on individual arbitrators.
One set of studies focuses on investor win rates and recoveries. In
1992, the General Accounting Office (1992) published the results of a
study of arbitration awards during an 18-month period in 1989 and
1990. The GAO found that claimants received an award of monetary
damages in 59 percent of arbitrations and received, on average, 61 percent of claimed damages. Comparing this with American Arbitration
Association arbitrations in which claimants received awards in 60 percent of cases and received an average of 57 percent of claimed damages,
the GAO found no basis to conclude that the arbitration process was
systematically biased in favor of the industry. In 2000, the GAO published an updated report that reflected data from 1992 to 1998. That
11. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority imposed additional qualification requirements on chairs as part of its 2007 revisions (after the period of our study). In addition
to the requirement that chairs be public arbitrators, the rules now provide that, to be
eligible for the chairperson roster, arbitrators must have completed chairperson training
or have substantially equivalent training and experience and either (1) have a law degree
or be a member of the bar and have served as an arbitrator on at least two cases or (2)
have served as an arbitrator on at least three cases.
12. FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation (http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
AboutFINRAADR/statistics/index.htm). These numbers also include intraindustry disputes.
Parties may resolve their cases through direct settlement or by participating in a FINRA
mediation process.
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study found that investors’ win rates had declined to an average of 51
percent over the time period but reasoned that this decline might be the
result of an increase in settled claims rather than a proindustry bias,
concluding that “the declining win rate could indicate little or no change
in the fairness of the arbitration process.” More recent data indicate
that the investor win rate has continued to decline. Statistics from FINRA
show that investors received an award of monetary damages or other
nonmonetary relief in 42 percent of the cases decided in 2006 and in
37 percent in 2007.
In the late 1990s, Gary Tidwell, then director of Neutral Training
and Development for NASD Regulation, supervised a survey of participant perceptions of the fairness of the arbitration process (Tidwell,
Foster, and Hummel 1999). The study reviewed evaluations submitted
by investors in NASD arbitrations at the close of their hearings over a
15-month period between December 1, 1997, and April 1, 1999. According to the Tidwell report, 93.49 percent of respondents agreed that
their cases were handled fairly and without bias, and 91.67 percent of
respondents rated the arbitrators as good or excellent. The response rate
for the survey, however, was only 10–20 percent. Moreover, the evaluations were frequently submitted before receiving the award.
In 2002, Michael Perino was retained by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to prepare a report analyzing arbitrator conflict disclosure
requirements in self-regulatory organization (SRO) arbitrations (Perino
2002).13 Perino studied whether the then-existing SRO disclosure requirements were sufficient to assure investors that arbitrators were neutral and impartial. Perino did not conduct his own empirical analysis
but, relying on the GAO and Tidwell studies, concluded that “the available evidence on arbitration outcomes does not suggest that arbitrators
tend to have pro-industry biases” (p. 34). Perino also concluded that
existing disclosure requirements were generally adequate, but he recommended that the arbitrator rules be amended “to emphasize that all
conflict disclosures are mandatory” (p. 14). He also recommended that
the definition of public arbitrator be reexamined, in particular to assess
whether an arbitrator should be disqualified on the basis of the industry
ties of a nonhousehold family member. Finally, he recommended that
additional research be conducted on investor attitudes concerning arbitration.
13. The purpose of the report was to determine whether California’s newly adopted
ethics standards regarding disclosure of arbitrator conflicts of interest should be applied
to self-regulatory organization (SRO) arbitrations.
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Gross and Black (2008) recently released a study, commissioned by
the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, surveying participants
on their perceptions of fairness in arbitration. Participants generally believed that arbitrators were competent but were divided on the impartiality of the arbitrators and the overall fairness of the process. Customers, however, were considerably more skeptical than other participants,
and a majority of customers said that they would be more satisfied with
the process if arbitrators provided an explanation of the award.
Kondo (2006) examines the role of arbitrator bias and expertise in
the selection of arbitrators. Using data from NASD arbitrations from
1991 to 2004, Kondo found that lawyers and pro-industry arbitrators
are more likely to be selected to serve on panels. The pro-industry bias
of arbitrator selection, however, occurred only after the NASD rule
change in 1998 moving from NASD selection of panels to the list selection system. Kondo concluded that party control of selection results
in the brokerage firms, which are more likely to be repeat players, dominating the selection process and producing panels more likely to contain
arbitrators who tend to side with large brokerage firms. He also concluded that the increased probability that an attorney would get selected
after the 1998 reforms reflected a tendency for parties to select more
for expertise after the reforms.
O’Neil and Solin (2007) studied almost 14,000 NASD and NYSE
arbitrations that occurred between 1995 and 2004. The study reports
that investor win rates—cases in which the investor received an award
of any amount—dropped from a high of 59 percent in 1999 to 44 percent
in 2004. In cases in which investors received an award, the study found
that they recovered roughly 50 percent of the amount claimed. Cases
involving larger claims and larger brokerage firms resulted in smaller
investor recoveries. The authors also calculated expected recoveries and
compared those recoveries with the costs of pursuing an arbitration
claim, including forum fees, legal fees, and the cost of expert witnesses.
The authors concluded that an investor’s chance of receiving a substantial award against a major brokerage firm in SRO arbitration was approximately 12 percent, with expected recovery rates increasing for
smaller claims and against smaller firms.14 The study did not focus on
arbitrator characteristics or panel composition.
14. Indeed, the damages awarded by the arbitrator may overstate the investor’s actual
recovery. The Government Accounting Office ([GAO] 2000) reported that a substantial
percentage of SRO awards had not been paid. The GAO’s report indicated that about 80
percent of the $161 million awarded to investors, primarily in the form of NASD-
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A number of empirical studies have examined arbitration outside the
securities context. Labor arbitrations have received the most extensive
analysis. Empirical research has, for the most part, found little difference
between plaintiff win rates in litigation versus arbitration, but most
studies have found that litigated cases produce higher average awards
(Sherwyn, Estreicher, and Heise 2005). Even with the litigation available
as a basis for comparison, these studies acknowledge that the absence
of a reliable baseline makes it difficult to reach normative conclusions
about the fairness of arbitration relative to litigation. Researchers also
note that litigated cases may differ systematically from cases that are
arbitrated, which limits the value of comparing outcomes. In addition,
as with our study, the research in this area is hampered by lack of access
to information about settled cases.
One additional concern that might be traced to the role that attorneys
play in arbitration is the extent to which arbitration has come to resemble
litigation. Extended discovery, accompanied by discovery disputes and
abuses, is widely reported (Shorter 2005). Not surprisingly, the length
of time required to resolve a claim through the arbitration process has
increased substantially. Self-regulatory organization arbitration was
originally viewed as preferable to litigation in part because it was relatively fast and inexpensive (Ruder 1998). The overall turnaround time
for FINRA arbitration now averages around 16 months in cases for
which a hearing is held (Lackritz 2005). Although this is still significantly
faster than litigation, it is far from an expedited process.

3. HYPOTHESES

We principally focus on the role that attorneys play as arbitrators and
in particular on how their role as advocates may influence their arbitration awards. We posit that attorneys who represent brokerage firms
and brokers in arbitration are likely to be skeptical of investors’ claims
for compensation generally, which leads them to be less generous with
arbitration awards. Conversely, we predict that attorneys who represent
investors in arbitration are likely to be skeptical of the integrity of brokerage firms and brokers, which leads them to be more generous with
administered awards, was unpaid. The NASD responded to this report by establishing
procedures to monitor the payment of awards, and, in its 2003 follow-up report, the GAO
indicated that the percentage of unpaid rewards had declined substantially (Government
Accounting Office 2003). Nonetheless, the number of unpaid awards, particularly by defunct brokerages, remained significant.
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arbitration awards. We predict no effect for attorneys who represent
both brokerages and investors. We call this the financial interest hypothesis.
Attorney-arbitrators who represent brokerage firms
(investors) will make lower (higher) arbitration awards.
Hypothesis 1.

We also posit that the ideological views of attorney-arbitrators will
affect the awards they grant in arbitrations (Sisk and Heise 2005). Because arbitrators need to follow existing law only loosely, do not need
to provide reasons, and face only a remote possibility of judicial review,
arbitrators have substantial discretion in handling any particular case.
That discretion may allow the political perspectives of attorneyarbitrators to influence their awards. We call this the ideology hypothesis.
Attorney-arbitrators with a strong Democratic political preference grant significantly different awards compared with attorney-arbitrators with a strong Republican political preference.
Hypothesis 2.

The effect of these predilections is likely to be magnified when the
arbitrator serves as the chair of the arbitration, given the important role
that the chair plays in managing the proceedings, admitting evidence,
and so on. Moreover, the effect is also likely to be amplified if another
arbitrator on the panel shares the same background with the chair. We
call this a coalition effect.
Hypothesis 3.
Attorneys who represent brokerage firms (investors)
will make lower (higher) arbitration awards when they serve as chairs.
Hypothesis 4.
Attorneys who represent brokerage firms (investors)
will make lower (higher) arbitration awards when they serve with other
arbitrators with the same background.

4. EMPIRICAL TESTS

4.1. Description of Data Set

We obtained NASD arbitration awards from the FINRA arbitration
awards online site15 and from the LEXIS database. To generate a random
set of arbitrators, we randomly selected 15 arbitration awards involving
15. FINRA, Arbitration and Mediation: FINRA Arbitration Awards Online (http://
finraawardsonline.finra.org).
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Table 1. Arbitration Awards by Year

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

Awards

%

331
316
324
424
614
620
849
538
434
299
291
403
557
496
228
6,724

4.92
4.70
4.82
6.31
9.13
9.22
12.63
8.00
6.45
4.45
4.33
5.99
8.28
7.38
3.39
100.00

investor-claimants per month for the years 1998–2000; we refer to this
as our small sample. Some of the arbitrations that resulted in awards in
the 1998–2000 period were filed prior to 1998, which allows us to
generate a starting sample that includes arbitrators who were active prior
to the 1998 reforms. We identified the chair in each arbitration; these
chairs constitute our sample of arbitrators. Because of FINRA’s selection
procedures for chairs, these are almost all public arbitrators (we excluded
nonpublic chairs). We focus on chairs to select those arbitrators who
are more likely to have influence over arbitrations. Using this procedure,
we obtained a total of 422 arbitrators.
For each of the 422 arbitrators, we then collected information on
their arbitration awards as provided in the FINRA and LEXIS databases
from January 1, 1992, to December 31, 2006. We looked only at arbitration awards involving an investor-claimant. Table 1 reports the
number of arbitration awards in our sample by year.
As reported in Table 2, the arbitration proceedings took place in 44
different jurisdictions (including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia). The jurisdictions with the largest number of arbitrations were California (1,247), New York (969), and Florida (565).
4.2. Variable Description

The dependent variable for the majority of our tests is Compensation
Ratio, which is defined as the compensatory award (or settlement if
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Table 2. Arbitration Awards by Jurisdiction

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

Awards

%

1
4
125
9
1,247
228
7
102
565
110
24
1
121
14
2
1
54
79
53
78
309
123

.02
.07
2.22
.16
22.19
4.06
.12
1.81
10.05
1.96
.43
.02
2.15
.25
.04
.02
.96
1.41
.94
1.39
5.50
2.19

State
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Awards

%

112
1
31
57
7
39
969
123
171
21
64
198
2
5
36
316
31
1
39
73
1
66

1.99
.02
.55
1.01
.12
.69
17.24
2.19
3.04
.37
1.14
3.52
.04
.09
.64
5.62
.55
.02
.69
1.30
.02
1.17

reported) divided by the requested compensation amount.16 One potential weakness in this measure is that the claimant decides how much to
request as compensation, which creates room for exaggeration. Claimants may request punitive or exemplary damages as well as damages for
pain and suffering. However, these are listed separately in the arbitration
award, which allows us to exclude them from our measure of the compensatory damages. The compensatory damages will typically turn on
the number of securities involved in a particular transaction multiplied
by the losses the investor-claimant incurred on the securities. Because
information on the number of securities traded (as well as the increase
or decline in share price) is also available to the broker or brokerage
firm respondent, claimants have less leeway to inflate the requested compensation amount.
A number of factors may affect the compensation ratio. To control
16. We use Compensation Ratio rather than the absolute level of compensation
awarded as our dependent variable because we lack data on the actual damages suffered
by the claimants. Using the ratio rather than the raw figure mitigates the omitted variable
problem.
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Table 3. Arbitration Claims and Outcomes

Type of claim:
Suitability
Churning
Unauthorized Trades
Failure to Execute
Misrepresentation
Conversion
Base category (breach of fiduciary duty and/or contract)
Outcome:
No settlement
Settlement
Reported Settlement
Unreported Partial Settlement
Unreported Full Settlement
Total

Awards

%

3,385
1,169
1,675
1,241
4,627
295
206

49.76
17.19
24.63
18.24
68.02
4.34
3.03

5,965
759
51
211
497
6,724

88.7
11.3
.8
3.1
7.4
100.0

for these factors, our models include a number of variables relating to
the subject matter of the dispute, selection of the dispute for arbitrator
resolution, panel makeup, award, and state in which the arbitration
occurred. A list of variable definitions is provided in Table A1.
Subject matter controls include indicator variables for six common
areas of arbitration. Suitability is equal to one if the arbitration involved
a suitability claim, including claims relating to “know your customer”
(NYSE Rule 405)17 and NASD Rule 2310 issues,18 and zero otherwise.
Other subject matter indicator variables include Churning (a churning,
excessive trading, or excessive commission claim), Unauthorized Trades,
Failure to Execute (a failure to buy or sell as directed), Misrepresentation, and Conversion (a claim of theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals, or self-dealing). The base category consists of claims involving
a nonspecified breach of contract or violation of fiduciary duty. Table
3 reports on the frequency of the subject matter claims in our arbitration
sample. Misrepresentation and suitability claims are the most common.
We also include controls to address selection effects. Table 3 also
17. New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, the know-your-customer rule, requires member firms to use “due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer [and]
every order.”
18. National Association of Securities Dealers Rule 2310, the suitability requirement,
states that “[i]n recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security,
a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable
for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his
other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”
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reports on the settlements in our sample. The vast majority of settlements
are unreported; our sample includes a small number of settlements that
are reported—typically because only some of the respondents have settled.19 In those cases, the reported decision may or may not report the
settlement terms. The variable Reported Settlement is equal to one when
the arbitration resulted in a full or partial settlement and the settlement
amount was reported as part of the arbitration award (and was included
therefore in Compensation Ratio) and zero otherwise. Unreported Partial
Settlement is equal to one where the arbitration resulted in an unreported
partial settlement and the award (if any) against the remaining nonsettling respondents was reported and zero otherwise. All other things being
equal, we expect that awards in the case of an unreported partial settlement should be lower due to the settlement by a subset of the respondents.
Table 4 provides summary statistics on our opinion controls. Opinion
controls focus on characteristics of the claim that may affect the compensation ratio. Claimed Compensation is included because the absolute
level of compensation requested may affect the compensation ratio
awarded. Arbitrators may be less willing to grant a higher compensation
ratio for larger claimed compensation amounts, all other things being
equal, simply because they are reluctant to award large sums. Large
claims are more likely to be inflated by the claimant than are small ones.
Moreover, arbitrators may perceive a large award against an individual
broker or small firm as posing a risk of insolvency. A compensation ratio
of 20 percent for a $100,000 claim produces only a $20,000 award—
the same compensation ratio for a claim of $100 million is likely to be
more difficult to obtain. The mean claimed compensation for our sample
is $620,000, but the median is a much more modest $91,000. The compensation ratio is less skewed, with a mean award of 32 percent of the
claim and a median of 11 percent. To account for possible nonlinearity
in the relationship between compensation ratio and claimed compensation, we also include a squared term for claimed compensation.
The number of arbitrators is correlated with the claimed compensation amount. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority typically
requires a panel of three arbitrators for claimed compensation amounts
of over $50,000. The overwhelming majority of the awards in our sample
19. The strength of cases that settle may be different from those that do not settle.
Moreover, the claimants who settle are arguably more risk averse than those who do not,
which may affect their investment decisions as well.
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Claimed Compensation ($ millions)
Compensation Ratio
Inexperienced
Number of Arbitrators
Respondent Failed to Appear
Claimed Punitive Damages
Claimed CRD Expungement
Actual Punitive Damages
Actual CRD Expungement
Median state income (1999)
Median partner income (1999)

Variable

Table 4. Arbitration Characteristics

.620
.324
.064
2.616
.121
.301
.198
.044
.155
43,248.9
234,647

Mean
.025
.000
.000
3.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
39,927.0
228,080

25%
.091
.112
.000
3.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
43,393.0
217,790

Median

.273
.656
.000
3.000
.000
1.000
.000
.000
.000
47,203.0
246,380

75%

12.628
.391
.244
.783
.326
.461
.398
.205
.362
4,018.9
30,097

SD
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came from three-arbitrator panels. We also include a control variable
for arbitrator experience, Inexperienced, which is set to one if the award
is from the first year that the arbitrator appeared in the data set and
zero otherwise. Arbitrators new to the job may be reluctant to make
large awards because it may reduce their chances for future selection.
Several opinion controls deal with the strength of the case; stronger
cases should result in a higher compensation ratio. Unfortunately, we
have no direct measure of the strength of the claimant’s case, so we rely
on three proxies. Respondent Failed to Appear is equal to one if any of
the respondents failed to appear at the arbitration hearing and zero
otherwise. Respondents may not appear if their case is weak; alternatively, failing to appear itself may lead the arbitrators to view the respondents’ case as less meritorious. In most cases a default award is
entered against the nonresponding party. At least one respondent failed
to appear at an arbitration hearing in 12 percent of the awards in our
sample. We use a request of punitive damages by the claimant (Claimed
Punitive Damages) as a proxy for a relatively strong case. Although
punitive damages can be (and are) claimed in connection with each of
the claim types in our classification, we hypothesize that claimants request punitive damages in cases involving more egregious wrongdoing
or when they have hard evidence of fraud or other culpable misconduct.
Many claims request an unspecified amount of punitive damages. This
measure may be relatively noisy, as some lawyers will request punitive
damages in every case, while others never do. We define Claimed Punitive
Damages as equal to one, however, only when the claimant has made
the punitive damages claim with some specificity. Two situations fall
within this definition: cases in which we observe that the claimant requests a positive dollar amount of punitive damages—fixing in the arbitrators’ minds a precise amount of punitive damages—and cases in
which we observe the actual award of punitive damages, which indicates
that the claimant took actions during the arbitration hearings to press
its claim for punitive damages.
Our final proxy for the strength of the case, Claimed CRD Expungement, is equal to one if the respondents requested that the Central Registration Depository (CRD) record of any of the respondent-brokers be
expunged and zero otherwise. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority maintains CRD records for active brokers that reflect customer
complaints and disciplinary proceedings. Arbitrators may, at their discretion, choose to expunge the arbitration claim from the CRD records
for a broker involved in arbitration; expungement has the effect of eras-
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ing the record of the claim from the broker’s CRD file. Although NASD
rules adopted in 2004 provide that arbitrators may grant expungement
requests only under specific conditions,20 a recent Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association study (2007) found that expungement remains
common.21 We treat a respondent as requesting CRD expungement in
cases in which we observe the respondent requesting the expungement
in the award summary and in cases in which we observe the actual award
of CRD expungement, which indicates that the respondent actively pursued expungement during the arbitration hearings. We treat a request
for CRD expungement as an indication that the respondents’ case was
stronger relative to the claimants’ case. We consider this proxy to be
the noisiest of the three in light of the consistent criticisms leveled at
arbitration panels for awarding expungement without an adequate basis.
Finally, our models include state controls for the state in which the
arbitration hearing took place, which we treat as exogenous to the variables in our data set. We measure our state controls as of 1999, the
midpoint of our data set. The state controls include the median household state income (State Income) and the average partner salary for the
state (Partner Income). States with higher income may have a different
investor clientele than states with lower incomes. Higher law firm salaries
correlate with an increased opportunity cost for qualified individuals to
serve as arbitrators, which arguably leads to lower quality arbitrators.
We also include indicator variables for the three states with over 500
arbitrations (New York, California, Florida).
4.3. Financial Interest

To test the financial interest hypothesis, we include a series of independent variables to test the importance of a financial relationship among
attorneys who serve as arbitrators. The base case is defined to be nonattorney arbitrators. Attorney is defined as one if the arbitrator is an
attorney and zero otherwise. Attorney_Investor is equal to one if the
arbitrator has acted as an attorney in other arbitrations and represented
investors in more than 75 percent of these arbitrations and zero oth20. In 1999, the NASD temporarily halted expungement by arbitrators after complaints
were raised. In 2004, it adopted new rules providing that arbitrators could expunge a
broker’s record only if the “arbitration panel found that an investor’s allegations had been
factually impossible or false, or that the accused broker had not been individually involved
in the matter” (FINRA Rule 2130).
21. The New York Times reported that, in 2005, FINRA expunged 907 customer
complaints from brokers’ records, or 13 percent (Browning 2007).
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Table 5. Attorneys as Arbitrators: Summary Statistics

Status
Attorney
Attorney_Investor
Attorney_Brokerage
Not attorney
Total

Arbitrators

%

347
45
16
75
422

82.2
10.7
3.8
17.8
100.0

erwise. Attorney_Brokerage is equal to one if the arbitrator acted as an
attorney in other arbitrations and represented brokerage firms or brokers
in more than 75 percent of these arbitrations and zero otherwise.22 Table
5 provides summary statistics for these variables.
Additional variables relating to financial interest include Industry Arbitrator Background, which equals one if the arbitrator was designated
as an industry arbitrator in other arbitration proceedings and zero otherwise. (Designation as a public or industry arbitrator can and does
change.) We include an independent variable for whether the arbitration
is in the arbitrator’s first year in our data set (Inexperienced; excluding
1992, the first year covered by our data set). The model also includes
subject matter, opinion, and state controls. We estimate the following
equation for each award using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors clustered by individual arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi p a ⫹ b1i Attorneyi ⫹ b 2i AttorneyInvestori
⫹ b3i AttorneyBrokeragei
⫹ b 4i Industry Arbitrator Backgroundi
⫹ b5i Inexperienced i ⫹ bji Subject Matterji
⫹ bkiOpinion Controlski ⫹ bli State Controlsli
⫹ Year Effects ⫹ i .
Table 6 reports the results of our first model. We find partial support
for the financial interest hypothesis. The coefficient on Attorney
_Brokerage is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level.
The presence of an arbitrator who acted as an attorney for a brokerage
22. Note that this variable is likely underinclusive, as it does not capture nonarbitration
representation of industry clients. This underinclusion biases against finding any significant
result.
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firm in other arbitration proceedings correlates with a 7.5-percentagepoint lower arbitration award (measured as a percentage of the claimed
compensation). The coefficient on Industry Arbitrator Background is
also negative, although significant at only the 10 percent level. The presence of an arbitrator with an industry arbitrator background correlates
with a 5-percentage-point lower arbitration award. These results are
consistent with the view that prior employment relationships may affect
arbitration awards. Arbitrators who act as attorneys for brokerage firms
or brokers may tend to side with brokerage firms and brokers in customer arbitration proceedings, perhaps because those attorneys have a
more sympathetic view of the industry generally. Alternatively, attorneys
who have worked for brokerage firms may have greater industry expertise, which causes them to be more skeptical of investors’ claims. The
available data do not allow us to assess the merits of claims, so we
cannot exclude the possibility that lower rewards are a more accurate
resolution of the claims. We do not find a corresponding effect for attorneys who represent investors; the coefficient for Attorney_Investor is
insignificant.
We also find that inexperienced arbitrators make smaller awards. The
coefficient on Inexperienced is negative and significant at the 10 percent
level. Having an inexperienced arbitrator correlates with a 3.4percentage-point lower arbitration award to claimants, which is consistent
with the proposition that arbitrators early in their careers may hesitate to
make large awards, perhaps in the hope that they will be selected more
often by brokerage firms in future cases.23
The influence of a financial interest may turn on the extent of an
attorney-arbitrator’s relationship with brokerage firms and brokers. To
assess this question, we divide Attorney_Investor and Attorney_
Brokerage in model 1 on the basis of whether the attorney-arbitrator
represented a client in at least three other arbitrations (for arbitrators
who acted at least once as an attorney in other arbitration proceedings).
We denote these as Many Cases and attorney-arbitrators who repre23. We divided our subject matter categories into subjective claims (suitability, churning, and misrepresentation claims) and more objective claims (unauthorized trades, failure
to execute, and conversion). We then added to model 1 an indicator variable for a subjective
claim (Subjective) as well as interaction terms between Subjective and the variables
Attorney_Investor and Attorney_Brokerage. Unreported, the coefficient on Subjective was
negative and insignificant (at the 13.1 percent level), which suggests that arbitrators are
more skeptical of such claims. The coefficients on Subjective # A ttorney_Investor and
Subjective # Attorney_Brokerage, however, were both insignificant.
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Attorney
Attorney_Investor
Attorney_Brokerage
Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)
Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)
Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
Industry Arbitrator Background
Inexperienced
Suitability
Churning
Unauthorized Trades
Failure to Execute
Misrepresentation
Conversion
Claimed Compensation
Claimed Compensation2

Variable

⫺.050⫹
⫺.034⫹
⫺.011
⫺.023⫹
.029*
⫺.007
.016
.055*
⫺.012**
.000**
(⫺1.860)
(⫺1.880)
(⫺.980)
(⫺1.850)
(2.430)
(⫺.520)
(1.520)
(2.020)
(⫺4.100)
(4.010)

⫺.020 (⫺1.300)
⫺.005
(⫺.190)
⫺.075** (⫺3.160)

(1)

Table 6. Attorneys as Arbitrators: Regression Analysis

⫺.016
.006
⫺.030
⫺.096**
⫺.049⫹
⫺.034⫹
⫺.011
⫺.023⫹
.029*
⫺.007
.015
.056*
⫺.012**
.000**

⫺.020

(2)

(⫺.460)
(.170)
(⫺.490)
(⫺5.100)
(⫺1.810)
(⫺1.850)
(⫺.970)
(⫺1.830)
(2.440)
(⫺.510)
(1.500)
(2.040)
(⫺4.110)
(4.010)

(⫺1.300)

⫺.051
.015
⫺.079
⫺.254**
⫺.138*
⫺.068
⫺.021
⫺.017
.082**
⫺.006
.045⫹
.116*
⫺.033**
.000**

(⫺.920)
(.270)
(⫺.760)
(⫺3.460)
(⫺2.520)
(⫺1.530)
(⫺.910)
(⫺.560)
(3.230)
(⫺.190)
(1.810)
(2.240)
(⫺4.180)
(3.020)

⫺.064* (⫺2.050)

(3)

⫺.235
.078
⫺.310
⫺.640**
⫺.363*
⫺.063
.036
.213**
.305**
.034
.180**
.197
⫺.026⫹
.000

⫺.194

(4)
⫹

(⫺1.090)
(.510)
(⫺.810)
(⫺5.770)
(⫺2.350)
(⫺.510)
(.530)
(2.760)
(4.470)
(.420)
(2.740)
(1.210)
(⫺1.660)
(.280)

(⫺1.690)
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⫺.023**
.269**
.033**
⫺.109**
.243**
.208**
.000
.000⫹
⫺.026
.007
.013
.461**
5,864
.1283
(⫺3.290)
(17.200)
(3.220)
(⫺8.180)
(4.940)
(6.700)
(.020)
(⫺1.950)
(⫺1.190)
(.430)
(.670)
(4.970)

⫺.023**
.269**
.034**
⫺.109**
.243**
.208**
.000
.000*
⫺.027
.007
.009
.464**
5,864
.1283
(⫺3.270)
(17.210)
(3.260)
(⫺8.170)
(4.960)
(6.700)
(.000)
(⫺1.970)
(⫺1.230)
(.420)
(.440)
(5.000)

⫺.021
.533**
.067**
⫺.339**
.525**
.454**
.000
.000⫹
⫺.059
.010
.014
.434*
5,864
.0695
(⫺1.420)
(16.620)
(2.780)
(⫺9.700)
(4.690)
(8.010)
(⫺.570)
(⫺1.770)
(⫺1.240)
(.310)
(.320)
(2.240)
.000
.000
⫺.137
⫺.040
⫺.061
.752
5,625
.0708

(⫺1.150)
(⫺.600)
(⫺.860)
(⫺.360)
(⫺.530)
(1.120)

.129**
(3.460)
1.386** (14.150)
.160*
(2.590)
⫺1.052** (⫺12.140)

Note. The dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are ordinary least squares estimations with
errors clustered by arbitrator; model 3 is a Tobit model, and model 4 is a logit model in which Award equals one for a positive award and zero otherwise.
All models include year indicator variables.
⫹
Significant at ≤ 10%.
* Significant at ≤ 5%.
** Significant at ! 1%.

Number of Arbitrators
Respondent Failed to Appear
Claimed Punitive Damages
Claimed CRD Expungment
Reported Settlement
Unreported Partial Settlement
Median State Income
Median Partner Income for State
New York
California
Florida
Constant
N
Adjusted R2/pseudo R2

132 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 9 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 0

sented clients in two or fewer arbitrations as Few Cases. Model 2 of
Table 6 reports the results of our modified model. Note from the model
that the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and
significant at less than the 1 percent level (which corresponds to a 9.6percentage-point reduction in the arbitration award); in contrast, the
coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases) is negative but not significant. The financial interest hypothesis holds primarily for attorneyarbitrators who served as counsel in more than the median number of
arbitrations.24
The coefficients for many of the control variables are as expected.
The compensation ratio increases when a respondent failed to appear
and when claimants sought punitive damages; stronger cases result in
higher arbitration awards. Conversely, the compensation ratio is lower
when the respondents sought an expungement of a broker’s CRD record.
Settled cases tend to result in a higher compensation ratio. The coefficient on Reported Settlement is positive and significant at less than
the 1 percent level. This suggests that brokerage firms and brokers tend
to settle the strongest cases. Even awards for nonsettling respondents in

24. As a robustness test, we reestimate model 2 using a Tobit model to control for the
limitation that the dependent variable, Compensation Ratio, ranges only from zero to one.
Reported as model 3 of Table 6, the Tobit model generates the same qualitative results as
model 2, supporting the financial interest hypothesis with respect to attorneys who represent
brokers or brokerage firms. Note, however, that the coefficient on Inexperienced is not
significantly different from zero in this model. As an additional robustness test, we reestimate model 1 of Table 6 for only those arbitration awards that did not result in a partial
or full settlement. Unreported, these models returned qualitatively the same results as the
models in Table 4. We also reestimate model 1 of Table 6, replacing Claimed Compensation2
with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the requested compensation amount was
greater than $1 million. Unreported, the models returned qualitatively the same results as
the models in Table 6. Finally, we reestimate model 2 using a logit model and replacing
the dependent variable with Award, defined as equal to one if the arbitration resulted in
positive compensation to the claimant and zero otherwise (with errors clustered by arbitrator). In the logit model, Reported Settlement and Unreported Partial Settlement were
dropped as independent variables because both correlated perfectly with a positive award.
Reported as model 4 of Table 6, the logit model generates the same qualitative results as
model 2, again supporting the financial interest hypothesis. As with model 2, however, the
coefficient on Inexperienced is also insignificantly different from zero. As an additional
robustness test, we reestimate model 4 with an indicator variable, Award, equal to one if
an award equal to 5 percent or more of the claimed compensation amount was given and
zero otherwise. Unreported, the reestimated model returned the same qualitative results as
model 4, supporting the financial interest hypothesis.
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cases that involve an unreported partial settlement reflect a higher compensation ratio.25
It is possible that financial influence operates differently in large cases,
in which the stakes are higher. To test the importance of case size, we
reestimated model 2, creating two subsamples for arbitrations with
(1) the median or lower claimed compensation amount and (2) greater
than the median claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant
at less than the 1 percent level only for the subsample with the median
or lower claimed compensation amount.26 This finding suggests that
arbitrators’ financial interests matter only for those arbitrations involving smaller dollar amounts. One possibility is that larger cases correlate
with more careful screening of arbitrator lists by claimants’ attorneys.
4.4. Ideology

These findings may not result from the experience of arbitrators serving
as attorneys in other cases but may instead reflect the underlying worldviews of the arbitrators. The lack of written opinions and minimal judicial review may give more latitude to arbitrators’ ideological views.27
Attorneys who are skeptical of compensation may choose to represent
brokerage firms rather than investors. Arbitrators who are skeptical of
regulation generally may be less generous with arbitration awards. An
arbitrator who is more pro-investor may side with the customers and
grant higher arbitration awards on the same set of facts.
To assess whether ideology affects arbitration awards, we use political
25. As a robustness test, we separately estimate model 2 in Table 6 solely for arbitrations involving three-arbitrator panels and for one-arbitrator panels, in each case excluding
Number of Arbitrators. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in model 2.
The coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the 5
percent level in the three-arbitrator panel model and negative and significant at less than
the 1 percent level in the one-arbitrator panel model. Unlike model 2, however, the coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases) is negative and significant at less than the 1
percent level for the one-arbitrator panel model. Thus, for one-arbitrator panels, having
an attorney-arbitrator with brokerage firm ties correlates with reduced awards even when
his or her brokerage firm relationship is less extensive. One-arbitrator panels may give the
single arbitrator greater leeway.
26. We also estimate this model using only three-arbitrator panels (excluding Number
of Arbitrators). In unreported results, we obtain the same qualitative results as for the
model that includes both one- and three-arbitrator panels. The coefficient on Attorney
_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level only
for arbitrations with median or lower claimed compensation amounts.
27. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority now gives the parties the option to
request an explanation for the arbitrator’s decision (FINRA Regulatory Notice 09–16).
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Table 7. Ideology of Arbitrators: Summary Statistics

Attorneys’ Political Party
Democrat
Republican
Neither
Total

Arbitrators

%

57
36
324
422

13.5
8.5
78.0
100.0

contributions to construct a proxy for the likely political outlook of the
attorney-arbitrators in our sample. We hypothesize that arbitrators who
contribute to the Democratic party are more likely to be sympathetic to
investors and that arbitrators who contribute to the Republican party
are more likely to favor the brokerage industry. We searched the
OpenSecrets.org Web site for contributions by our attorney-arbitrators
to federal political candidates.28 If an arbitrator contributed money only
to Republicans, we labeled the arbitrator as a Republican; arbitrators
who contributed only to Democrats, we labeled as Democrat. Table 7
reports on the breakdown of our attorney-arbitrators on the basis of
this classification. Because we focus on those who actually contribute
money to political campaigns, arbitrators whom we term either Republican or Democrat likely not only identify with that party but also hold
strong views. Note that the proxy is underinclusive; the overwhelming
majority of arbitrators (78.6 percent) made no reported political contributions, but this does not mean that they lack an ideological perspective.29
We estimate the following equation for each arbitration award using
ordinary least squares and robust standard errors clustered by each individual arbitrator:

28. Center for Responsive Politics, Donor Lookup: Find Individual and Soft Money
(http://www.opensecrets.org/indivs/index.php).
29. Of the 75 non-attorney-arbitrators, only 2 (or 2.67 percent) are identified as Democrat; the remaining non-attorney-arbitrators are either Republican or not identified with
a particular party. In contrast, of the 347 attorney-arbitrators, 57 (or 16.43) are identified
as Democrat (difference significant at less than the 1 percent level). Among subsets of
attorneys, there is less distinction based on identification as a Democrat. Of the 16 attorneys
with a brokerage firm relationship, three (or 18.75 percent) are identified as Democrat; of
the 45 attorneys with an investor relationship, nine (or 20.00 percent) are identified as
Democrat. The difference is not statistically significant.
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Compensation Ratioi p a ⫹ b1i Attorneyi ⫹ b 2i DemocratAttorneyi
⫹ b 4i Attorney Investor (Few Cases)i
⫹ b3i RepublicanAttorneyi
⫹ b5i Attorney Investor (Few Cases)i
⫹ b6i Attorney Brokerage (Few Cases)i
⫹ b7i Attorney Brokerage (Many Cases)i
⫹ b8i Industry Arbitrator Backgroundi ⫹ b9i Inexperiencedi
⫹ bji Subject Matterji ⫹ bkiOpinion Controlski
⫹ bli State Controlsli ⫹ Year Effects ⫹ i .

The model reestimates model 2 of Table 6 with the addition of independent variables for whether an attorney-arbitrator contributes to
Democrats or Republicans.
Model 1 of Table 8 reports our results. The coefficient on Democrat_
Attorney is positive and significant at less than the 1 percent level (corresponding to a 4.9-percentage-point increase in the arbitration award
measured as a percentage of the claimed compensation); the coefficient
on Republican_Attorney is negative and insignificant, albeit on a relatively
small number of observations. The difference between the two coefficients
is significant at the 5 percent level. Democrat attorney-arbitrators give
significantly higher awards than Republican attorney-arbitrators, which
supports the view that ideology has a significant effect on arbitration
awards. Model 1 also reports that the coefficient for Attorney_Brokerage
(Many Cases) continues to be negative and significant at less than the 1
percent level (corresponding to a 9.8-percentage-point decrease in the arbitration award).30
30. As a robustness test, we reestimate model 1 of Table 8 for only those arbitration
awards that did not result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, the model returned
qualitatively the same results as the models in Table 8. We also reestimate model 1 of Table
8, replacing Claimed Compensation2 with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the
requested compensation amount was greater than $1 million. Unreported, the models returned qualitatively the same results as model 1 of Table 8. Model 2 of Table 8 reestimates
the model with the use of a Tobit regression to control for the limitation that the dependent
variable, Compensation Ratio, ranges only from zero to one. Model 2 reports results
qualitatively similar to model 1. The coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is positive and now
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⫺.080*
.111**
.023
⫺.050
.010
⫺.067
⫺.255**
⫺.133*
⫺.068
.442*
5,863
.0704

⫺.026
.049**
⫺.007
⫺.013
.004
⫺.026
⫺.098**
⫺.048⫹
⫺.034⫹
.471**
5,863
.1296
(⫺1.620)
(2.640)
(⫺.310)
(⫺.390)
(.100)
(⫺.430)
(⫺4.880)
(⫺1.770)
(⫺1.850)
(5.010)

(2)

(1)
(⫺2.510)
(3.170)
(.530)
(⫺.890)
(.190)
(⫺.640)
(⫺3.480)
(⫺2.430)
(⫺1.540)
(2.270)

⫺.248*
.284**
.223
⫺.248
.071
⫺.266
⫺.628**
⫺.343*
⫺.063
.709
5,624
.0723

(3)
(⫺2.130)
(2.860)
(1.620)
(⫺1.190)
(.480)
(⫺.690)
(⫺5.110)
(⫺2.210)
(⫺.510)
(1.030)

Note. The dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Model 1 is an ordinary least squares estimation with errors
clustered by arbitrator, model 2 is a Tobit model, and model 3 is a logit model in which Award equals one for a positive award and zero otherwise. All
models include controls for subject matter, opinion, and state and year indicator variables.
⫹
Significant at ≤ 10%.
* Significant at ≤ 5%.
** Significant at ! 1%.

Attorney
Democrat Attorney
Republican Attorney
Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)
Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)
Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
Industry Arbitrator Background
Inexperienced
Constant
N
Adjusted R2/pseudo R2

Variable

Table 8. Ideology of Arbitrators: Regression Analysis
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To test the importance of arbitration size, we reestimated model 1
for the subsamples of arbitrations with (1) the median or lower claimed
compensation amount and (2) greater than the median claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is
positive and significant at less than the 1 percent level, and the coefficient
on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at less
than the 1 percent level only for the subsample with the median or lower
claimed compensation amount. Ideology and financial interests matter
only for those arbitrations involving smaller dollar amounts.31
4.5. Importance of the Arbitration Chair

For our main sample of 6,724 arbitrations we collect data only on our
starting set of arbitrators. Given the labor required, we do not collect
information on the other arbitrators (if any) on the arbitration panel.
The lack of information on the other arbitrators introduces a possible
omitted variable problem. We address this potential problem in two
ways. First, in this section, we code for whether the arbitrator in our
significant at the 5 percent level. Model 3 of Table 8 uses logistic regression replacing
Compensation Ratio with the indicator variable Award as the dependent variable (equal
to one if a positive award was received and zero otherwise). Model 3 reports the same
qualitative results as model 1, which supports the hypothesis that the ideology of the
arbitrators affect arbitration outcomes. We reestimate model 3 of Table 8 with an award
indicator variable equal to one if an award equal to 5 percent or more of the claimed
compensation amount was given and zero otherwise. Unreported, the reestimated model
returned the same qualitative results as model 3 of Table 8. As an additional robustness
test, we reestimate model 1 of Table 8 solely for arbitrations involving three-arbitrator
panels and for one-arbitrator panels in each case excluding Number of Arbitrators. In
unreported results, we obtain the same qualitative results as in model 1. In both models,
the coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The
coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at the 5 percent
level in the three-arbitrator panel model and negative and significant at less than the 1
percent level in the one-arbitrator panel model. Unlike model 1, however, the coefficient
on Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases) is also negative and significant at less than the 1 percent
level in the one-arbitrator panel model.
31. As a robustness test, we reestimated model 1 of Table 8 for only three-arbitrator
panels (excluding Number of Arbitrators), creating two subsamples for arbitrations with
(1) the median or lower claimed compensation amount (with the median measured solely
for three-arbitrator panel arbitrations) and (2) greater than the median compensation
amount. In unreported results, we obtain similar qualitative results as for the model that
includes both one- and three-arbitrator panels. The coefficient on Democrat_Attorney is
positive and significant at the 5 percent level only for the arbitrations with median or lower
claimed compensation amounts. The coefficient on Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is
negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level only for the arbitrations with median
or lower claimed compensation amounts. On the other hand, the coefficient on Arbitrator
_Brokerage (Few Cases) is now positive and significant at the 10 percent level.
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sample is the chair of the arbitration proceeding. Second, in the next
section, we collect more detailed information on the arbitration and all
the arbitrators for a random subsample of our arbitrations.
To analyze whether other attorney characteristics, such as education
and experience, affect the level of arbitration awards, we collect additional information from the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (1999)
about the attorneys who serve as arbitrators in our sample. As proxies
for general attorney skill, we create two indicator variables: Atty_Rated,
which is coded as one if Martindale-Hubbell reported an AV or BV rating
for the attorney-arbitrator and zero otherwise, and Atty_Top_LawSchool,
which is coded as one if the lawyer graduated from a law school ranked
in the top 10 by U.S. News and World Report (1991) and zero otherwise.
As proxies for familiarity with the subject matter of securities arbitration,
we create two additional indicator variables: Atty_Securities_Practice,
which is coded as one if securities law is listed as within the scope of the
attorney’s practice in Martindale-Hubbell and zero otherwise, and Atty_
Solo_Practice, which is coded as one if a lawyer practices alone rather
than with a firm. Securities experience is not a dominant characteristic
among our attorney-arbitrators. Many are drawn to securities arbitration
on the basis of their experience with arbitration generally, such as in
employment law.32
We hypothesize that the chair has the ability to influence the outcome
of the arbitration disproportionately. This hypothesis is consistent with
the greater compensation paid to chairs and FINRA’s decision to impose
additional qualification requirements on the chair and to modify the
chair selection process. Among the duties assigned to the arbitrator who
serves as chair are resolving pretrial motions and controlling the presentation of evidence and other aspects of the arbitration proceeding.
These procedural steps may influence the ultimate outcome; moreover,
the chair’s central role in the proceedings may lead the other arbitrators
to defer to him or her.
To test the importance of the chair’s influence, we estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least squares and robust
standard errors clustered by arbitrator:

32. Because these data are collected from Internet-based sources and we have limited
identifying information about our arbitrators, the professional data are incomplete and
noisy.
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Compensation Ratioi p a ⫹ b1iChair_Attorneyi ⫹ b 2iChair_Democrat_Attorneyi
⫹ b3iChair_Republican_Attorneyi ⫹ b 4iChair_Atty_Rated i
⫹ b5iChair_Atty_Top_LawSchool i
⫹ b6iChair_Atty_Securities_Practicei
⫹ b7iChair_Atty_Solo_Practicei
⫹ b8iChair_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)i
⫹ b9iChair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)i
⫹ b10iChair_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)i
⫹ b11iChair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)i
⫹ b12iChair_Industry_Arb_Background i
⫹ b13iOther_Attorneyi ⫹ b14iOther_Democrat_Attorneyi
⫹ b15iOther_Republican_Attorneyi ⫹ b16iOther_Atty_Rated i
⫹ b17iOther_Atty_Top_LawSchool i
⫹ b18iOther_Atty_Securities_Practicei
⫹ b19iOther_Atty_Solo_Practicei
⫹ b 20iOther_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)i
⫹ b 21iOther_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)i
⫹ b 22iOther_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)i
⫹ b 23iOther_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)i
⫹ b 24iOther_Industry_Arb_Background i
⫹ b 25i Inexperiencedi ⫹ bji Subject Matterji
⫹ bkiOpinion Controlski
⫹ bli State Controlsli ⫹ Year Effects ⫹ i .

The model divides the arbitration into attorney variables (Attorney
_Investor and Attorney_Brokerage) and the arbitrator characteristic variables and into two groups based on whether the arbitrator was the chair
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in the particular arbitration proceeding. The division allows us to test
whether the position of the arbitrator matters in the arbitration. Model
1 of Table 9 reports our results for this regression. Model 2 of Table 9
reestimates model 1 using a Tobit model. Model 3 reestimates model 1
using a logit model and Award as the dependent variable.
Model 1 of Table 9 reports that the coefficient on Chair_
Democrat_Attorney is positive and significant at less than the 1 percent
level. Chair_Democrat_Attorney correlates with a 5.6-percentagepoint increase in the arbitration award measured as a percent of the
claimed compensation. The coefficient on Other_Democrat_Attorney is
not significantly different from zero. Similarly, in the Tobit and logit
models, the coefficients on Chair_Democrat_Attorney are positive and
significant at the 5 percent level, while the coefficients on Other_
Democrat_Attorney are insignificant. For ideology, only the chair arbitrator position is important in our model.
Similarly, model 1 of Table 9 reports that the coefficient on
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is negative and significant at
less than the 1 percent level. Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
correlates with a 9.1-percentage-point decrease in the arbitration award.
The coefficient on Other_Attorney_Brokerage is also negative and significant at the 5 percent level (corresponding to a 10.3-percentage-point
decrease in the arbitration award). In the Tobit model, Chair_
Attorney_Brokerage is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent
level, while the coefficient on Other_Attorney_Brokerage is insignificant.
In the logit model reported in model 3, the coefficients for both
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage and Other_Attorney_Brokerage are negative
and significant at less than the 1 percent level. Summing up, for affiliation
with the securities industry, the chair arbitrator position is significant in
all three of our models. The other arbitrator position is significant only
in models 1 and 3.33
33. We reestimate model 3 of Table 9 with an award indicator variable equal to one
if an award equal to 5 percent or more of the claimed compensation amount was given
and zero otherwise. Unreported, the reestimated model returned the same qualitative results
as model 3 of Table 9, although the coefficient for Other_Attorney_Brokerage, while still
negative, is significant only at the 5 percent level. To test the importance of arbitration
size, we reestimated model 1 for the subsamples of arbitrations with (1) the median or
lower claimed compensation amount and (2) greater than the median claimed compensation
amount. Unreported, the coefficient on Chair_Democrat_Attorney is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level, and the coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is
negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level only for the subsample with the
median or lower claimed compensation amount.
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Our test omits the background and ideology of the other arbitrators
on the arbitration panel. The results (particularly for ideology) do suggest, however, that the arbitrator who matters most is the chair, although
industry affiliation involving other arbitrators may also influence arbitration awards.34
Our tests may be affected by sample selection bias; that is, our results
are contingent on an award being reported. However, the vast majority
of cases are settled, and cases resulting in unreported settlements may
differ significantly from cases that are resolved through a hearing. Most
important for our purposes, particular arbitrator characteristics may
lead to a greater likelihood of settlement. Cases rarely settle before discovery is conducted, with most cases settling just prior to the hearing.
Thus, claimants know the identity of the arbitrators when they agree to
settle. Claimants may realize that attorney-arbitrators who represent
brokers and brokerage firms, for example, favor brokers and brokerage
firms in their awards. Claimants may settle such cases rather than risk
a low award. The omission of such settlements from our sample may
cause our tests to understate the influence of the attorney-arbitrators in
our sample.
To ascertain whether our arbitrator characteristic variables of interest
correlate with the propensity to settle, we test whether certain arbitrator
characteristics correlate with an increased propensity to settle using our
sample of settlements and arbitration awards.35 We estimate a logit
model in which Settlement is the dependent variable and equal to one
when there is a settlement and zero otherwise. We use the same independent variables as in our arbitrator characteristic model in Table 9
above with one change. We drop Reported Settlement and Partial Unreported Settlement. In unreported results, we found that if the chair is
an attorney who has securities practice experience, the likelihood of
settlement is significantly increased. None of the other coefficients on
the arbitrator characteristic variables are significantly related to the propensity to settle, including the industry affiliation and ideology-related
34. As a robustness test, we reestimate model 1 of Table 9 only for those arbitration
awards that did not result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, these models returned
qualitatively the same results as model 1 of Table 9. We also reestimate model 1 of Table
9, replacing Claimed Compensation2 with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the
requested compensation amount was greater than $1 million. Unreported, the models returned qualitatively the same results as model 1 of Table 9.
35. Kondo (2006) employs a similar procedure to assess the importance of sample
selection bias in his sample of arbitrations. This approach is imperfect because cases involving a partial settlement may not be representative of other settled cases.
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Chair_Attorney
Chair_Democrat_Attorney
Chair_Republican_Attorney
Chair_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)
Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
Chair_Industry_Arbitrator_Background
Chair_Atty_Rated
Chair_Atty_Top_LawSchool
Chair_Atty_Securities_Practice
Chair_Atty_Solo_Practice
Other_Attorney
Other_Democrat_Attorney
Other_Republican_Attorney
Other_Attorney_Investor (Few Cases)

Variable

Table 9. Significance of the Arbitration Chair

⫺.086*
.127**
.008
.022
.044
⫺.134
⫺.236**
⫺.199*
⫺.048
.087⫹
.018
.027
⫺.057
.038
.057
⫺.189

⫺.025
.056**
⫺.013
.016
.016
⫺.052
⫺.091**
⫺.083*
⫺.017
.036
.001
.009
⫺.024
.017
.010
⫺.074
(⫺1.280)
(2.640)
(⫺.520)
(.370)
(.410)
(⫺.820)
(⫺3.750)
(⫺2.400)
(⫺1.110)
(1.570)
(.050)
(.640)
(⫺.970)
(.530)
(.190)
(⫺1.620)

(2)

(1)

(⫺2.190)
(3.260)
(.160)
(.330)
(.740)
(⫺1.130)
(⫺2.830)
(⫺2.400)
(⫺1.620)
(1.930)
(.410)
(.970)
(⫺1.020)
(.470)
(.600)
(⫺1.490)

⫺.298*
.300**
.212
⫺.120
.144
⫺.327
⫺.584**
⫺.307
⫺.112
.189
.037
.095
⫺.207
.247
.288
⫺.443

(3)
(⫺2.240)
(2.610)
(1.380)
(⫺.480)
(.770)
(⫺.690)
(⫺3.990)
(⫺1.210)
(⫺1.230)
(1.180)
(.260)
(1.090)
(⫺1.190)
(1.130)
(1.330)
(⫺1.370)
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⫺.037
.126
⫺.103*
⫺.018
.008
.030
.002
⫺.016
⫺.032
.479**
5,858
.1295
(⫺.660)
(1.190)
(⫺2.200)
(⫺.490)
(.350)
(.700)
(.060)
(⫺.700)
(⫺1.760)
(5.130)

⫺.088
(⫺.720)
.308
(1.190)
⫺.258 (⫺1.590)
⫺.080 (⫺1.110)
.037
(.650)
.046
(.500)
⫺.070
(⫺.720)
⫺.047
(⫺.880)
⫺.067 (⫺1.500)
.469
(2.390)
5,858
.0718

⫺.093
.347
⫺.649**
⫺.362⫹
.180
.000
⫺.372
⫺.075
⫺.061
.804
5,620
.0738

(⫺.260)
(.770)
(⫺2.610)
(⫺1.940)
(1.160)
(.000)
(⫺1.510)
(⫺.490)
(⫺.480)
(1.160)

Note. The dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Model 1 is an ordinary least squares estimation with errors
clustered by arbitrator, model 2 is a Tobit model, and model 3 is a logit model in which Award equals one for a positive award and zero otherwise.
All models include controls for subject matter, opinion, and state and year indicator variables.
⫹
Significant at ≤ 10%.
* Significant at ≤ 5%.
** Significant at ! 1%.

Other_Attorney_Brokerage (Few Cases)
Other_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
Other_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
Other_Industry_Arbitrator_Background
Other_Atty_Rated
Other_Atty_Top_LawSchool
Other_Atty_Securities_Practice
Other_Atty_Solo_Practice
Inexperienced
Constant
N
Adjusted R2

144 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 9 ( 1 ) / J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 0

Table 10. Small Sample by Year

Year
1998
1999
2000
Total

Frequency

%

155
134
140
429

36.1
31.2
32.6
100.0

variables. This analysis is not an entirely adequate substitute for a twostage selection model, but in the absence of a viable instrument for such
a model, it does give some reassurance about the validity of our results.
4.7. The Mix of Arbitrators

To assess the importance of the mix of arbitrators on an arbitration
panel, we narrow our sample to the initial small sample used to select
our arbitrators. This sample consists of 429 randomly selected awards
from 1998 to 2000. Table 10 summarizes the number of arbitrations in
our subsample by year.
For each arbitration in our subsample, we collect similar information
on attorney and political contributions for the other arbitrator members
of the panel. We expand on the opinion controls used in the full-sample
model to include the number of hearings in the arbitration as a measure
of the complexity of the arbitration (Number of Hearings). We also
include the length of the arbitration opinion as another measure of case
complexity (Opinion Length). To control for the strength of the presentation of the case, we add indicator variables coded as one if the claimant
is represented by counsel (Claimant Attorney Present) or the respondent
is represented by counsel (Respondent Attorney Present) and zero otherwise. Better presentation may lead to better outcomes. These variables
may also correlate with case strength—claimants with strong cases are
more likely to be able to attract an attorney to work on a contingency
fee basis, while respondents with no defenses may not bother to hire
counsel.
As an additional control, we include Top_Accused_Brokerage_Firm,
which is set to one if any of the respondents were one of the top 10
brokerage firms as of 1998 (Securities Industry Association 1998). A
large brokerage firm may have repeat-player advantages and greater
resources in defending those complaints, which leads to lower awards.
Descriptive statistics on these additional variables are presented in Table

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Thu, 23 Apr 2015 15:26:09 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AT T O R N E Y S A S A R B I T R AT O R S /

145

11, along with the descriptive statistics for the small sample for the
variables used in the prior models.
We estimate the following equation for each arbitration award using
ordinary least squares and robust standard errors clustered by individual
arbitrator:
Compensation Ratioi p a ⫹ b1iChairAttorneyi
⫹ b 2iChairDemocratAttorneyi
⫹ b3iChairRepublicanAttorneyi
⫹ b 4iChairAttorneyInvestor (Many Cases)i
⫹ b5iChairAttorneyBrokerage (Many Cases)i
⫹ b6iChairIndustryArbBackgroundi
⫹ b7iTop Accused Brokerage Firmi
⫹ b8i Inexperiencedi ⫹ b9iClaimant Attorney Presenti
⫹ b10i Respondent Attorney Presenti
⫹ bji Subject Matterji ⫹ bkiOpinion Controlski
⫹ bli State Controlsli ⫹ Year Effects ⫹ i .

Model 1 of Table 12 reports our results using an ordinary least squares
model with errors clustered by individual arbitrator.
Note in model 1 that the Chair_Republican_Attorney coefficient is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. Chair_Republican_Attorney
correlates with an 8.5-percentage-point decrease in the arbitration award
measured as a percent of the claimed compensation. The Chair_
Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) coefficient is significant at the 5 percent
level (and negative). Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) correlates
with a 13.2-percentage-point decrease in the arbitration award. In contrast, the coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases) is not significantly different from zero. The results from our large-sample tests carry
forward to our subsample.
Note from model 1 that the coefficient on Top Accused Brokerage
Firm is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level (corresponding to a 14.1-percentage-point reduction in the arbitration award).
Larger firms appear to be able to defend their actions better, resulting
in lower compensation awards. The coefficient on Claimant Attorney
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Claimed Compensation ($ millions)
Compensation Ratio
Inexperienced (Chair)
Number of Prior Awards (Chair)
Respondent Failed to Appear
Claimed Punitive Damages
Claimed CRD Expungement
Actual Punitive Damages
Actual CRD Expungement
Claimant Attorney Present
Respondent Attorney Present
Number of Hearings
Opinion Length
Top Accused Brokerage
Median State Income (1999)
Median Partner Income (1999)

Variable

Table 11. Small-Sample Characteristics

.307
.373
.112
11.8
.223
.306
.157
.095
.102
.865
.826
5.3
4.6
.095
43,383.1
232,935.2

Mean
.048
.000
.000
3.0
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
1.000
3.0
4.0
.000
39,927.0
217,790.0

25%
.090
.200
.000
8.0
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
1.000
4.0
4.0
.000
43,393.0
228,080.0

Median
.232
.815
.000
16.0
.000
1.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
1.000
7.0
5.0
.000
47,493.0
285,120.0

75%

1.042
.408
.315
12.6
.417
.461
.364
.294
.303
.342
.380
4.2
1.1
.294
4,171.1
29,254.3

SD
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⫺.058
⫺.141**
⫺.036
.103*
⫺.203**
.532*
.3015
(⫺.930)
(⫺3.260)
(⫺.740)
(2.100)
(⫺3.150)
(2.000)

.030
.123
⫺.068
⫺.219*
⫺.058
⫺.146**
⫺.033
.099*
⫺.202**
.534*
.2986

(.470)
(.940)
(⫺1.330)
(⫺2.230)
(⫺.930)
(⫺3.310)
(⫺.660)
(1.990)
(⫺3.110)
(2.010)

⫺.006
(⫺.130)
.024
(.510)
⫺.082⫹ (⫺1.660)

⫺.005
(⫺.100)
.025
(.550)
⫺.085⫹ (⫺1.730)

.039
(.630)
⫺.132* (⫺2.220)

(2)

(1)

(⫺.130)

.030
.123
⫺.069
⫺.222*
⫺.058
⫺.146**
⫺.033
.100*
⫺.202**
.544*
.2969

(.470)
(.940)
(⫺1.330)
(⫺2.250)
(⫺.930)
(⫺3.310)
(⫺.660)
(2.000)
(⫺3.100)
(2.010)

.024
(.520)
⫺.077 (⫺1.490)
⫺.167* (⫺2.120)

⫺.006

(3)

Note. The dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. The t-statistics are in parentheses. All models are ordinary least squares estimations with errors
clustered by arbitrator and include controls for subject matter, opinion, and state controls and year fixed effects. Note that the variable
Chair_Democrat_Arbitrator w/ Coalition with Other Arbitrators was zerofor all observations and was dropped from the model. N p 390.
⫹
Significant at ≤ 10%.
* Significant at ≤ 5%.
** Significant at ! 1%.

Chair_Attorney
Chair_Democrat_Attorney
Chair_Republican_Attorney
Chair_Democrat_Attorney, No Coalition
Chair_Republican_Attorney, No Coalition
Chair_Republican_Attorney, with Coalition
Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases)
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases)
Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases), No Coalition
Chair_Attorney_Investor (Many Cases), with Coalition
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases), No Coalition
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases), with Coalition
Chair_Industry_Arbitrator_Background
Top Accused Brokerage Firm
Inexperienced
Claimant Attorney Present
Respondent Attorney Present
Constant
Adjusted R2

Variable

Table 12. Small-Sample Arbitrator Coalitions
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Present is positive and significant at the 5 percent level (corresponding
to a 10.3-percentage-point increase in the arbitration award). Not surprisingly, claimants that hire attorneys fare better. This may be because
attorneys help present the claimants’ case more persuasively because
claimants who know they have a stronger case will expend the resources
to hire an attorney or because attorneys perform a screening function
by agreeing to take a case. Similarly, the coefficient on Respondent Attorney Present is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level
(corresponding to a 20.3-percentage-point decrease in the arbitration
award). Respondents who hire an attorney pay lower compensation
awards.36
To test the importance of the other nonindustry arbitrators, we divide
our financial interest and ideology variables on the basis of whether the
chair arbitrator sits on the same panel with a nonindustry arbitrator of
the same persuasion (denoted as “with coalition”) or not (denoted as
“no coalition”). Model 2 reports the results with solely the financial
interest variable divided on the basis of panel composition, and model
3 reports the results with both financial interest and ideology variables
so divided.
Model 2 reports that the coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Brokerage
(Many Cases), No Coalition, is negative but not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many
Cases), with Coalition, is negative and significant at the 5 percent level
(corresponding to a 21.9-percentage-point decrease in the arbitration
award). The pairing of an arbitrator chair who is a brokerage attorney
with a similar arbitrator results in significantly lower awards for investor-

36. To test the importance of arbitration size, we reestimated model 1 for the subsamples of arbitrations with (1) the median or lower claimed compensation amount and (2)
greater than the median claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the coefficient on
Chair_Attorney_Brokerage (Many Cases) is significant at the 10 percent level (and negative)
only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation amount. The
coefficient on Claimant Attorney Present is positive and significant at less than the 1 percent
level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation amount. The
coefficient on Respondent Attorney Present is negative and significant at the 5 percent and
less than the 1 percent levels in the subsamples with the median or lower claimed compensation amount and greater than the median claimed compensation amount, respectively.
Last, the coefficient on Top Accused Brokerage Firm is negative and significant at less than
the 1 percent level only for the subsample with the median or lower claimed compensation
amount. Thus, most of the effects we identify appear significant only for the smaller arbitration awards.
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claimants.37 This evidence suggests that a coalition of like-minded arbitrators results in a greater shift in the arbitration award than in cases
in which only a single arbitrator has a background characteristic that
may affect the arbitration outcome.
Model 3 reports results similar to those in model 2. In addition, the
coefficients on Chair_Republican_Attorney, No Coalition, and Chair_
Democrat_Attorney, No Coalition, are both insignificant at conventional
levels. The coefficient on Chair_Republican_Attorney, with Coalition, is
negative and significant at the 5 percent level (corresponding to a 16.7percentage-point reduction in the arbitration award). Thus, we find
mixed evidence that chair arbitrators are more likely to decide according
to their ideology if joined with a similar-minded nonindustry arbitrator.38
4.8. Testing the Impact of the National Association of Securities
Dealers Reforms

Our final set of tests relates to the reforms adopted in 1998 and 2004
by the NASD. Those reforms were intended to enhance the fairness of
the process, thereby helping investors, but they sought to achieve that
goal through very different mechanisms. The 1998 reforms shifted the
selection of arbitrators from the NASD to the parties, putting the onus
on parties to exclude arbitrators whom they perceived as biased. The
2004 reforms narrowed the definition of a public arbitrator, excluding
individuals with a broader range of personal and professional ties to the
securities industry.
The effect of the 1998 reforms thus depends largely on the knowledge
and sophistication of the parties, which may favor repeat players (Bingham 1997). If brokerage firms have greater access to information about
arbitrators and greater resources to spend on the selection process, the
1998 reforms might benefit them more than claimants. On the other
hand, many claimants’ attorneys are also repeat players who compile
and maintain data on individual arbitrators. The greatest disparity is
likely to be found in cases in which the claimant is not represented by
37. As a robustness test, we reestimate the models of Table 12 only for those arbitration
awards that did not result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, these models returned
qualitatively the same results as the models in Table 12. We also reestimate the models of
Table 12, replacing Claimed Compensation2 with an indicator variable, Million, for whether
the requested compensation amount was greater than $1 million. Unreported, the models
returned qualitatively the same results as the models in Table 12.
38. As a robustness test, we attempted to reestimate the models of Table 12 with Tobit
models. However, the models failed to converge to a full set of coefficients and t-statistics
for the coefficients.
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counsel. The 2004 reforms seem more directly aimed at potential conflicts of interest, although it is unclear if the new limitations were significant.
Kondo (2006) found that the 1998 reforms tilted the selection of
arbitrators toward more pro-brokerage firm arbitrators, suggesting that
party control over panel composition favored repeat players over oneshot claimants. Kondo also reported that more attorneys are selected as
arbitrators after the 1998 reforms, which led him to conclude that expertise increased among arbitrators after the 1998 reforms. Kondo’s
study faces the problem that the pool of all available arbitrators is not
publicly available because the NASD does not release information about
the pool of arbitrators beyond reporting the percentage of public and
industry arbitrators. Thus, Kondo’s tests are unable to control for the
background pool of available arbitrators, which may have shifted over
time.
Given the data problems posed for testing selection, our tests focus
on how arbitrators changed their behavior in response to the incentives
created by the reforms. If, for example, the reforms gave brokerage firms
greater clout, we would expect arbitrators to reduce their awards against
brokerage firms in the postreform time period in hopes of remaining
attractive to brokerage firms in future cases. Accordingly, we pose both
these hypotheses in null form.
Hypothesis 5.
The 1998 reforms had no significant effect on the
incentives of arbitrators to side for (or against) brokerage firms and brokers.
Hypothesis 6.
The 2004 reforms had no significant effect on the
incentives of arbitrators to side for (or against) brokerage firms and brokers.

To test the impact of the 1998 and 2004 reforms, we reestimate model
1 in Table 6 using the full 1992–2006 sample, excluding arbitrations
commenced in 1998 and 2004. For each model in Table 6, we remove
the year indicator variables and substitute two indicator variables, Post1998 Reforms and Post-2004 Reforms, indicating whether the arbitration was initiated after 1998 or 2004. We remove all arbitrator-specific
variables and instead use arbitrator fixed effects. The use of arbitrator
fixed effects allows us to control for arbitrator characteristics in assessing
the impact of the 1998 and 2004 reforms. Arbitrator fixed effects allow
us to examine how any specific arbitrator changed his or her awards
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subsequent to the 1998 and 2004 reforms in response to the incentives
created by these reforms. Model 1 of Table 13 reports our results for
the full sample, using an ordinary least squares model with errors clustered by each individual arbitrator.
From model 1, note that the coefficient for the 1998 reforms is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent level (corresponding to a
4.6-percentage-point reduction in the arbitration award measured as a
percentage of the claimed compensation). Thus, greater party involvement in the selection process correlates with a reduction in the size of
investor arbitration awards. Although it is difficult to assign causality,
this evidence casts doubt on the claim that the 1998 reforms assisted
investors. We can speculate that brokerage firms, as repeat players in
the process, may have had an advantage in collecting information about
arbitrators, thus allowing the firms to use the selection process more
strategically. Arbitrators may also have reduced the size of their awards
in an effort to be attractive to brokerage firms in future cases.
The coefficient for the 2004 reforms, which were more unambiguously intended to help investors, is insignificant. We find no evidence
that the 2004 reforms tilted the balance toward investors or brokers and
brokerage firms one way or the other. It is important to note that because
we are testing arbitrator fixed effects, we do not capture the possibility
that the 2004 reforms changed the composition of the pool. At the same
time, it does not appear that the adoption of the reforms, which were
motivated by claims of pro-industry bias, caused continuing arbitrators
to change their awards.
To test the importance of arbitration size, we reestimate model 1 for
the subsamples of arbitrations with (1) the median or lower claimed
compensation amount and (2) greater than the median claimed compensation amount. Unreported, the coefficient on the 1998 reform indicator variable is negative and significant at less than the 1 percent
level only for the subsample of arbitrations with greater than the median
claimed compensation amount. Brokerage firms may have used information about arbitrators more strategically after the 1998 reforms—
focusing primarily on larger cases in which the investment in using such
information was most cost justified.
To assess the impact of the 1998 reforms on cases with varying
strength, we added interaction terms between the Post-1998 Reform and
the three case-strength variables (Respondent Failed to Appear, Claimed
Punitive, and Claimed Expungment) to model 1 of Table 13. Unreported,
the coefficient on Post-1998 Reform remains negative but now is sig-
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(2)
⫺.043** (⫺2.830)
⫺.007
(⫺.190)
⫺.078** (⫺3.490)
.489** (2.870)
4,806
.1961

(1)
⫺.046** (⫺3.090)
.001
(.020)
⫺.059** (⫺2.840)
.515** (3.060)
5,196
.2096

⫺.074** (⫺2.730)
⫺.033
(⫺.370)
⫺.106* (⫺2.360)
.521** (2.950)
5,196
. . .

(3)

.018
(.170)
⫺.133 (⫺.550)
⫺.167 (⫺1.030)
⫺.885** (⫺.810)
4,866
.1339

(4)

Note. The dependent variable is Compensation Ratio. The models exclude arbitrations started in the years 1998 and 2004. The t-statistics are in
parentheses. Models 1, 3, and 4 for are for the full sample; model 2 is for the sample of pre-1998 arbitrators only. Models 1 and 2 are ordinary least
squares estimations with errors clustered by arbitrator; model 3 is a Tobit random effects model with arbitrator effects, and model 4 is a logit model
in which the dependent variable Award equals one for a positive award and zero otherwise. All models include arbitrator fixed effects and subject
matter, opinion, and state controls.
* Significant at ≤ 5%.
** Significant at ! 1%.

Post-1998 Reforms
Post-2004 Reforms
Inexperienced
Constant
N
Adjusted R2

Variable

Table 13. The Effect of Reforms on Arbitrator Incentives
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nificant at only the 10.4 percent level. The interaction term between
Post-1998 Reform and Claim Punitive is negative and significant at less
than the 1 percent level (the coefficients on the other case-strength interaction terms are not significantly different from zero). This finding
suggests that the negative impact of the 1998 reforms on investor awards
occurred disproportionately for stronger investor claims.
Some arbitrators in our sample started as arbitrators after the 1998
reforms. As a robustness test, we reestimate model 1 of Table 13 using
only arbitrators who started prior to 1998 (reported as model 2). Model
2 reports the same qualitative results as model 1. As an additional robustness test, we reestimate model 1 using a Tobit random-effects model
(using arbitrator effects). Model 3 reports the same qualitative results
as model 1 for the Tobit random-effects model.39 Last, we reestimate
model 1 using a logit model with an indicator (Award) for whether the
arbitration resulted in any compensation for the claimant as the dependent variable (reported as model 4). Unlike the other three models, the
coefficient on Post-1998 Reform is not significantly different from zero
in model 4.40

5. CONCLUSION

Both industry connections and ideology affect arbitration awards. We
report evidence that attorney-arbitrators are influenced by their experience representing brokers or brokerage firms in other arbitrations. Attorneys who represent brokers or brokerage firms render significantly
lower arbitration awards when they serve as arbitrators. Those attorneyarbitrators with strong political views also award systematically different
arbitration awards. Democrat attorney-arbitrators award significantly
greater awards than Republican attorney-arbitrators. These effects appear to be largely driven by smaller awards.
39. As a robustness test, we reestimate model 1 of Table 13 only for those arbitration
awards that did not result in a partial or full settlement. Unreported, the model returned
qualitatively the same results as in model 1. We also reestimate model 1 of Table 13
replacing Claimed Compensation2 with an indicator variable, Million, for whether the
requested compensation amount was greater than $1 million. Unreported, the model returned qualitatively the same results as model 1.
40. We reestimated model 4 of Table 13 with an award indicator variable equal to
one if an award equal to 5 percent or more of the claimed compensation amount was given
and zero otherwise. Unreported, the reestimated model returned the same qualitative results
as model 4 of Table 13.
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The 1998 reforms correlate with a reduction in overall awards for
any given arbitrator. Party control over the selection of the arbitrators
appears to increase arbitrators’ incentives to cater to the interests of
brokers and brokerage firms. Perhaps brokers and brokerage firms, as
repeat players, are better able to assess and strike less sympathetic arbitrators. On the other hand, investors appear able to focus on obvious
conflicts of interests.
Generally, our findings show that arbitrator characteristics affect arbitration outcomes. Our limited ability to determine whether the differences in results are due to bias, expertise, or other factors suggests a
need for greater transparency in the arbitration process, including increased disclosure about arbitrator backgrounds and greater explanation
of case awards.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Variable Definitions
Variable
Attorney_Investor

Attorney_Brokerage

Industry Arbitrator
Background
Inexperienced

Suitability

Churning

Unauthorized Trades

Definition
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitrator has acted
as an attorney in other arbitrations and represented
investors in more than 75% of these arbitrations and
zero otherwise
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitrator acted as
an attorney in other arbitrations and represented
brokerage firms or brokers in more than 75% of these
arbitrations and zero otherwise
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitrator was
designated as an industry arbitrator in other arbitration
proceedings and zero otherwise
Indicator variable equal to one if the award in question
was decided in the first year that the arbitrator’s awards
appear in the data set (other than in 1992) and zero
otherwise
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration involved
a suitability claim, including claims involving “know
your customer” (NYSE Rule 405) and NASD Rule
2310 issues and zero otherwise
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration involved
a claim of churning, excessive trading, or excessive
commission and zero otherwise
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration involved
a claim of unauthorized trading and zero otherwise
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continued

Variable

Definition

Failure to Execute

Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration involved
a claim that the broker or brokerage firm failed to
execute a transaction, failed to monitor an account
properly, improperly executed a transaction, or engaged
in activities that resulted in errors in a customer
account and zero otherwise
Misrepresentation
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration involved
a claim of misrepresentation, fraud, failure to disclose,
Rule 10b-5, common-law fraud, or a deceptive sales
tactic and zero otherwise
Conversion
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration involved
a claim of theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals,
or self-dealing and zero otherwise
Claimed Compensation
Amount of claimed compensation in dollars by the
arbitration claimants
Compensation Ratio
Total amount of compensation award divided by the
claimed compensation amount
Award
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration resulted
in positive compensation to the claimant and zero
otherwise
Number of Arbitrators
Number of arbitrators involved in the arbitration
Respondent Failed to
Indicator variable equal to one if any of the respondents
Appear
failed to appear at the arbitration hearing and zero
otherwise
Claimed Punitive Damages
Indicator variable equal to one if punitive damages were
requested or imposed on any of the respondents in the
arbitration award and zero otherwise
Claimed CRD Expungement Indicator variable equal to one if any of the respondentbrokers requested that the Central Registration
Depository records be expunged or if those records
were expunged and zero otherwise
Reported Settlement
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration resulted
in a full or partial settlement and the settlement amount
was reported and zero otherwise
Unreported Partial
Indicator variable equal to one if the arbitration resulted
Settlement
in a partial settlement and the settlement amount was
not reported (but the award for the nonsettling
respondents was reported) and zero otherwise
Chair_Ratio
Number of arbitrations in which a specific arbitrator
served as chair divided by the total number of
arbitrations for the specific arbitrator
State Income
Median household income for the state in 1999
Partner Income
Average partner salary reported for 1999 for the state
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